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This paper examines the impact of the revocation of tariﬀ exemptions on exports
of developing countries using data from cases of the Competitive Needs Limits (CNL),
a feature of the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). CNLs are arguably im-
posed on super competitive GSP beneﬁciaries and aim to reserve the GSP beneﬁts for
other “less competitive” GSP eligible countries. I ﬁnd that being excluded from the
GSP as a result of a CNL induces a large and signiﬁcant drop in imports from aﬀected
countries, both in value and in their share in total US imports. Contrary to the policy
objectives of CNLs, the excluded countries do not appear to be “super competitive.”
In addition, the ﬁndings suggest that much of the beneﬁts of CNLs accrue to non-GSP
countries, rather than other GSP beneﬁciaries.
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Export-led growth has been perceived as one of the promising paths to promoting economic
growth in developing countries. Consequently, developed countries instituted special pro-
grams that provide preferential access to their markets. In the case of the US, the General-
ized System of Preferences (GSP) oﬀers tariﬀ exemptions to about 130 developing countries.
The GSP has been credited with stimulating exports from developing countries (see Hoek-
man and Özden, 2005, for a survey), but its overall eﬀectiveness has been questioned by
several studies (Bureau et al., 2005; Hakobyan, 2010).
While the GSP waives tariﬀs to stimulate exports from developing countries, such exemp-
tions are removed for the most successful beneﬁciaries. More speciﬁcally, tariﬀ exemptions
are revoked when imports of a particular product from a given country or its share in total
US imports exceed a speciﬁc threshold, known as Competitive Needs Limit (CNL). Exporters
of such products are designated as “super competitive” and deemed to be no longer in need
of a preferential treatment.
But are the countries subject to CNLs truly “super competitive”? Are they able to
maintain their exports to the US (or market share) absent the tariﬀ exemptions under the
GSP? The evidence in the existing literature on the impact of CNLs is rather scant and
primarily descriptive (MacPhee and Rosenbaum, 1989; DeVault, 1996). Import shares of
aﬀected countries seem to decline a year or two after the CNL exclusion, with little change
in average imports.
A related question of interest is the potential impact of CNLs on imports from other GSP
beneﬁciary countries. If CNL-aﬀected countries are unable to compete, who replaces them?
Would the imports (and market shares) of other GSP beneﬁciaries rise and ﬁll the void, as
policymakers would hope, or would those of non-GSP countries expand?
This paper addresses two questions related to the impact of CNLs. First, it revisits the
question of what happens to the imports of products and countries aﬀected by CNLs. And
second, it further explores the likely beneﬁciaries of CNL exclusions. More speciﬁcally, it
2examines 204 cases of CNL exclusions between 1997 and 2009, tracking import values and
shares of aﬀected country-product pairs for at least one year prior to and up to ﬁve years
following the exclusion. Consistent with earlier ﬁndings, imports from excluded beneﬁciary
countries and their share in total US imports of a given product drop abruptly in the ﬁrst
year of exclusion. They also continue to decline several years after the exclusion. These
ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of country characteristics that control for the size of the
country and its stage of development. By the third year of exclusion, imports from aﬀected
countries decrease by more than 70 percent relative to the pre-exclusion average. Similarly,
import shares drop from 63 percent prior to the exclusion to 37 percent by the third year
of exclusion. These ﬁndings imply that CNLs may not be targeting the “super competitive”
exporters, rather these country-product pairs may need the preferential treatment to access
the US market.
I further show that the market share of other GSP eligible countries in total US imports
increases but less than that of non-GSP countries after the CNL is imposed. By the third
year of exclusion, the share of other GSP eligible countries increases by 8 percentage points,
whereas that of non-GSP countries expands by 22 percentage points. This suggests that
non-GSP countries beneﬁt from the CNLs more than other GSP beneﬁciaries, contrary to
the policy intent.
This paper makes three key contributions to the scant literature on the impact of CNLs.
First, it controls for exporting country characteristics commonly used in gravity-type models,
as well as year ﬁxed eﬀects. This improves on the earlier studies which relied on descrip-
tive statistics. Second, it uses relatively recent episodes of CNL exclusions over the years
1997-2009, whereas the exiting literature employs data through 1993. Third, this paper pro-
vides evidence of dynamic adjustment to the shock of rise in tariﬀs introduced by the CNL
exclusion, as imports are tracked up to ﬁve years after the exclusion.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background informa-
tion on the statutory provisions of the GSP concerning the implementation of CNLs. Section
33 describes the data and discusses the empirical strategy. Results are reported in Section 4,
and concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
2 Background
The US GSP oﬀers tariﬀ exemptions on some 5,000 products, at the Harmonized System
(HS) 8-digit level, imported from about 130 developing countries. At the same time, however,
GSP revokes these tariﬀ exemptions from the “most competitive” exporters who are deemed
to no longer need preferential treatment to access the US market. Two criteria are used
in determining whether a country-product pair has reached (or exceeded) the CNL. First,
whether the imports in the previous calendar year exceeded a certain value threshold, set at
$80 million in 1997, and increasing by $5 million every year (Table 1). Second, whether the
imports in the previous calendar year made up more than 50 percent of total US imports
of a given product (percentage CNL). Every year the US International Trade Commission
(USITC) publishes the list of country-product pairs that met these criteria and thus exceeded
CNL thresholds in the previous calendar year. These country-product pairs automatically
lose their eligibility for tariﬀ exemptions on July 1, unless a waiver is granted.1
The GSP statute allows for three types of waivers to avoid revocation of beneﬁts. First,
country-product pairs exceeding the percentage CNL are automatically considered for (but
not guaranteed) a de minimis waiver if total US imports of a given product are relatively
small and do not exceed a certain value ($13.5 million in 1997, and increasing by $0.5 million
every year; see Table 1 for a complete schedule). Second, the percentage CNL may also be
waived, 504(d) waiver, if a directly competitive product was not produced in the US on
January 1, 1995. Lastly, country-product pairs exceeding the value or percentage CNL (that
do not qualify for a de minimis waiver) may apply for a CNL waiver.
1CNL thresholds are not applicable to least developed countries and since 2000 to Sub-Saharan African
countries. An interesting episode of exclusion occurred in 2006 when a CNL waiver was revoked on imports
of kola nuts from Cote d’Ivoire immediately after it lost its beneﬁciary Sub-Saharan African country status
under AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act).
4The last option for receiving a waiver is best suited for large exporters who have suﬃcient
resources to petition for a CNL waiver both to the US Trade Representative (USTR) and
the USITC.2 The petitions may also be submitted by other interested parties, such as US
importing ﬁrms who would begin paying tariﬀs on their imports unless a CNL waiver is
granted. Additionally, the USTR and USITC may receive petitions opposing a CNL waiver
from domestic manufacturing ﬁrms whose products compete directly with imported products,
or domestic ﬁrms importing similar products from other low-cost countries. Both the USTR
and USITC conduct investigations and hold hearings, but the issues considered are not
identical. The USITC concentrates on the economic impact of CNL waivers on US consumers
and domestic industries producing a directly competitive product, while the USTR focuses
on policy issues and the competitiveness of a beneﬁciary country with respect to the product
in question.3
The goals of CNLs. How CNLs may be ineﬀective in achieving these goals?
CNLs aim to accomplish two policy objectives. The ﬁrst objective is to exclude country-
product pairs that are perceived to no longer need the preferential treatment. The underlying
assumption is that a country is suﬃciently competitive in producing and exporting a given
product. This implies that once CNL is imposed, we should not observe signiﬁcant changes
in the value or share of imports, a hypothesis tested in this paper.
The proper identiﬁcation of truly super competitive country-product pairs can be a dif-
ﬁcult undertaking. There may be external factors that aﬀect the level of imports from other
countries, thereby pushing a particular country over the CNL threshold. An illustrative
example of this is the recent imposition of punitive 35 percent tariﬀs on passenger car tires
from China (a non-GSP country) in September of 2009 for a period of three years (USITC,
2For instance, in 2008 14 country-product pairs were listed by the USITC as potential candidates for
CNL exclusions, of which 5 applied for a CNL waiver. The average value of imports from countries that
applied for a waiver stood at $235 million, compared to $32 million from countries that were also subject to
CNL but did not petition for a waiver.
3For more information on GSP annual reviews, see Blanchard and Hakobyan (work in progress).
52009). This action prompted a surge in demand for Thai tires and pushed Thai exports of
tires over the CNL value threshold. Even though Thailand is only the ninth largest source
of imported passenger tires to the US, its eligibility for GSP has been suspended as of July
1, 2010. Additionally, the exclusion decision exclusively based on imports of the previous
calendar year runs the danger of eliminating one-time exporters with no history of exporting
to the US but who happen to capture a large market share in just one year.
The secondary objective of CNLs is to enhance export opportunities of other “less com-
petitive” GSP beneﬁciaries after the tariﬀ exemptions are revoked for the “most competitive”
exporters.4 This argument assumes that the exports of other GSP eligible countries to the
US may have been crowded out by the exports of the “super competitive” countries, and
eliminating tariﬀ exemptions for the latter may stimulate exports from other countries eligi-
ble for the preferential treatment. This implies that after the imposition of CNLs the market
share of other GSP beneﬁciaries should rise.
Related literature
The existing literature on the impact of CNLs is very scant and primarily descriptive. There
are only two studies that explore the impact of CNLs on imports from the aﬀected countries.
MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989) examine 816 episodes of CNL exclusions between 1976 and
1983. Using descriptive statistics on trade ﬂows before and after the imposition of CNLs,
they conclude that the revocation of tariﬀ exemptions reduced the market shares of aﬀected
countries by an unweighted average of 23 percent and an import-weighted average of 6
percent, implying that CNL exclusions primarily target imports of minor products from
developing countries, rather than “major” items. They also found that the CNL exclusions
did not lead to signiﬁcant increases in market shares of least developed GSP beneﬁciaries,
rather mostly beneﬁtted advanced countries or major GSP beneﬁciaries.
DeVault (1996) extends the analysis in MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989) by examining
4It should be noted, however, that CNLs also serve to protect US domestic producers in import-sensitive
industries.
6the eﬀect on import values and import shares using 45 cases of CNL exclusions between
1988 and 1993. In line with ﬁndings by MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989), he concludes that
import shares of aﬀected countries decline after the CNL is imposed; unweighted import
shares decline by 12 percentage points on average, whereas import-weighted shares drop by
7 percentage points after two years of being excluded. He also ﬁnds that the average value of
imports slightly increases despite the imposition of CNLs, but the median value of imports
declines by about 44 percent two years after the CNL exclusion.
This paper expands on the scant literature in gauging the impact of CNLs on import
values and shares of aﬀected countries after controlling for country characteristics commonly
used in gravity-type models, as well as year ﬁxed eﬀects. It also uses the most recent
episodes of CNL exclusions over the years 1997-2009, whereas the exiting literature employs
data through 1993. Finally, it tracks imports up to ﬁve years after the exclusion to better
account for dynamic adjustments to the shock of introduction of tariﬀs.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
Data on CNLs (at the HS 8-digit level) are obtained from the USITC Tariﬀ Database, as well
as various notices and presidential proclamations published in Federal Register. These are
augmented with imports data from the USITC Trade Dataweb and GSP country eligibility
dataset.5 Given that CNL exclusions typically become eﬀective on July 1, an episode is
deﬁned as a case of exclusion when a country-product pair beneﬁtted from the GSP at least
one full year prior to the exclusion and was excluded for at least one full year following the
exclusion. Thus, cases where a country-product pair is excluded on July 1 of one year and
reinstated on July 1 of the following year are excluded from the sample. Furthermore, several
cases of exclusions are not considered here because country-product pairs were removed from
5GSP country eligibility dataset is available from the author upon request.
7the GSP as a result of petitions submitted by US domestic ﬁrms requesting a removal of
a given country-product pair; these episodes did not occur as a result of exceeding CNL
thresholds.6 The ﬁnal sample size is 1,038 observations on 204 episodes of CNL exclusions
between 1997 and 2009.7
Table 2 breaks down the number of episodes by country. India, Turkey, Brazil and
Colombia together account for about half of the episodes in the sample (Column 1). Several
countries were subject to CNL exclusions for the same product twice during the sample
period; this is reﬂected in the number of unique products reported in Column 2. Even
though India and Turkey were often subjected to CNL exclusions over the sample period,
the average value of their exports in the year prior to CNL exclusion is relatively small -
about $30 million (Column 3). The largest values of average pre-CNL imports are observed
for Kazakhstan at $191 million and Thailand at $168 million. Furthermore, the average
fraction of imports of the largest exporters is clearly below 50 percent threshold, conﬁrming
that they are likely hit by the value rather than percentage CNL. This is even more clearly
seen in Figure 1 which plots pre-CNL import shares against the GDP per capita with the size
of the circle indicating pre-CNL import values. Two insights can be gleaned from this ﬁgure:
ﬁrst, the majority of cases involve small imports and those exceeding percentage threshold;
and second, countries with GDP per capita less than $4,000 seem to be the primary targets
of CNLs.
Table 3 and 4 list the 20 smallest and 20 largest country-product pairs in my sample in
terms of import values. A careful observer may notice that the nature of products subject
6An example of such an episode is a revocation of tariﬀ exemptions for PET ﬁlm imported from Thailand,
as petitioned by four domestic producers of PET ﬁlm (DuPont Teijin Films of Wilmington, DE; Mitsubishi
Polyester Film of America of Greer, SC; Toray Plastics of North Kingstown, RI; and SKC America of
Covington, GA). They testiﬁed in favor of exclusion by stating that the Indian ﬁrm Polyplex had built a
plant in Thailand to be able to ship products to the US market without paying duties. Tariﬀ exemptions
on imports of this product from India were suspended in 1998. Although PET ﬁlm imports from Thailand
accounted for only one percent of US consumption and two percent of total PET ﬁlm imports into the US
in 2003, the removal request was granted and exclusion became eﬀective on July 1, 2004.
7One episode of CNL exclusion has been dropped from the analysis due to its outlier nature. India’s
exports of jewelry (HS 71131950) to the US were three times larger than the next largest country-product
pair in the sample. The main ﬁndings of the paper hold true even with this episode included in the analysis.
8to CNLs is very diﬀerent across the two tables. At the lower end, CNL exclusions are
predominantly imposed on agricultural products or products of food manufacturing (Table
3). At the higher end, the excluded products mainly include metals and chemicals (Table 4).
Another interesting observation in the data is the sequential exclusion of diﬀerent countries
exporting the same product. For instance, imports of articles of jewelry from Thailand
ceased to qualify for tariﬀ exemptions in 2006, followed by Turkey in 2007. Similarly, tariﬀ
exemptions on imports of insulated ignition wiring sets from Philippines were suspended in
2006, followed by Indonesia in 2007 (Table 4).
The impact of CNLs over time is captured by a set of dummy variables which take the
value of one for a given country-product pair in the year when CNL is imposed (year 0),
in the ﬁrst full year of exclusion (year 1), in the second year of exclusion (year 2) and in
the third through ﬁfth year (year 3+), respectively. As Table 5 shows, the year of exclusion
varies considerably across episodes in the sample. There are no exclusion episodes in 2002,
because the GSP program had expired (but renewed retroactively) and the CNL decisions
were postponed until the following year.
To examine how exports respond to the imposition of CNLs over time, the sample includes
up to ﬁve years of data following the exclusion whenever possible.8 Table 6 provides summary
statistics for import values and shares before and after the exclusion. The rules used to
construct the sample ensure that pre-CNL imports and imports in years 0 and 1 are observed
for all 204 episodes, but not necessarily in the subsequent years. In fact, about 60 percent
of the sample is lost by the third year of exclusion. With this caveat in mind, the value of
imports for a median country-product pair in the year prior to the imposition of CNL is just
$1.5 million, far from the CNL value thresholds in any year over the entire sample period.
As eluded to above, a large number of cases in the sample (176 out of 204, to be exact)
8Harmonized Tariﬀ System that classiﬁes imported products is periodically modiﬁed to reﬂect the chang-
ing pattern of the US imports. As a result, multiple codes may be combined into a new one, or one code
may be split into multiple new ones. Over the sample period such changes in product codes occurred in 2002
and 2007. Since it is impossible to discern whether the excluded products were exactly reclassiﬁed under a
diﬀerent code, the sample period for the products that were subject to a code change ends in either 2001 or
2006.
9did not exceed the value threshold, but exceeded the percentage threshold. Moreover, 135
of such cases were eligible for (but did not receive) a de minimis waiver. So it seems that
CNLs often target small exporters, resulting in zero import ﬂows as seen in the Panel A of
Table 6. In the year of exclusion, as exporters become ineligible for the GSP in the second
half of the year, imports drop across all percentiles, but the smallest exporters are hit the
hardest. Imports of the median country-product pair are almost cut in half (from $1.5 to $0.8
million). But even on the higher end of distribution, the average value of imports plummets.
This pattern is contrary to the ﬁndings by DeVault (1996); both average and median value
of imports immediately decline after the imposition of CNLs.
A similar pattern is observed for the shares of excluded country-product pairs in imports
from all trading partners, as shown in the Panel B of Table 6. More speciﬁcally, after the
exclusion, the average import share drops from 63 to 36 percent in year 0, down to 26 percent
in year 1, 23 percent in year 2 and so on. A steeper decline is observed for the import share
of a median country-product pair. In comparison to earlier estimates, these seem quite large:
the drop in average import share is 37 percentage points in my sample after two years of
exclusion (27 after one year), 23 percentage points in MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989), and
merely 12 percentage points in DeVault (1996). I surmise that the estimates by MacPhee and
Rosenbaum (1989) would have been closer to my estimates if imports less than $1 million in
1976 were not omitted in their study.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy in estimating the eﬀects of revocation of tariﬀ exemptions is two-fold.
First, I want to test whether the changes in imports from aﬀected countries are negligible
after the exclusion takes eﬀect, thus evaluating the eﬀectiveness of CNLs as a tool to detect
the most competitive exporters. And second, if there is a reduction in imports, the critical
question then is whether other GSP eligible countries were able to capture a larger market
share after preferential treatment is revoked from the most competitive GSP beneﬁciaries.
10To gauge the impact of quantitative limits such as CNLs on imports from GSP beneﬁciary
countries, I estimate country-product level regressions of the value (in million dollars) and
fraction of imports on the set of CNL measures, as deﬁned above. The base speciﬁcation is
the following:








cpt + cpt, (1)
where mcpt is either the value of imports of product p from country c in year t or the
fraction of imports of country c in total imports of product p in year t; αt is the year
t ﬁxed eﬀect; and D
(k)
cpt = 1 is the kth year of exclusion, with k = 0, 1, 2, 3+ (k = 0
denotes the year in which the CNL was imposed; k = 3+ denotes the third, forth or ﬁfth
year of exclusion). Standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for possible
correlated shocks to country-level imports over time.9 If CNLs correctly identify and exclude
the most competitive exporters, then the γs should be zero or very small as these exporters
do not need the tariﬀ exemptions to compete in the US market. But if these countries do
need tariﬀ exemptions to access the US market, and without these exemptions they would
likely reduce their exports to the US, then γs are expected to be negative and large in
absolute value.
One concern with the above speciﬁcation is that there may be some country characteris-
tics that contemporaneously aﬀect the imports from (and market share of) a given country.
For instance, GDP, GDP per capita and population have been extremely successful in ex-
plaining the pattern of bilateral trade in gravity-type models (Anderson, 2010). Per capita
GDP captures the positive relationship between the extent of trade and the stage of devel-
opment, whereas GDP and population capture the market size. I address this concern by
explicitly controlling for beneﬁciary country characteristics.
The second part of the empirical analysis focuses on the market shares of GSP eligible
9There may also be within a country-product correlation over time. To address this, I used two-way
clustering technique developed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) and found the results to be robust
to this speciﬁcation.
11and non-eligible countries. Once tariﬀ exemptions for “super competitive” exporters are
eliminated, other “less competitive” GSP eligible developing countries may capture the mar-
ket share of CNL-aﬀected countries as they continue exporting duty-free to the US, thus
accomplishing the secondary goal of CNLs. If CNLs indeed help other GSP beneﬁciaries,
then their import share should rise to make up for the loss in imports from CNL-aﬀected
countries. On the other hand, non-GSP countries, such as advanced economies and China,
may expand their market shares as they outcompete the CNL-aﬀected and other GSP eligi-
ble countries. This leads to an estimation of two additional equations similar to Equation (1)
for import shares for each of these groups of countries. Since the shocks to demand originate
from the US, the error terms are likely to be contemporaneously correlated, making SUR
(seemingly unrelated regression) the natural estimation technique. Using market shares for
other GSP eligible countries and non-GSP countries as dependent variables, the following
two-equation SUR model is speciﬁed:
m
gspoth

























cpt are the import shares of other GSP eligible and non-GSP
countries, respectively, that compete with CNL-aﬀected country c in the market for product
p in year t; α1t and α2t are the year t ﬁxed eﬀects; and D
(k)
cpt is deﬁned as in Equation (1). If
CNLs aim to beneﬁt other GSP beneﬁciaries, then the γ1ks should be signiﬁcantly greater
than the γ2ks in each post-CNL year k, implying a proportionately larger increase in the
market share of other GSP eligible countries. But if non-GSP countries beneﬁt from the
CNLs the most and capture larger market share, then the γ2ks are expected to be greater
than the γ1ks.
124 Results
4.1 Do CNLs target truly competitive exporters?
Using Equation (1) above, the estimated coeﬃcients on the post-exclusion year dummies D
(k)
cpt
in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 conﬁrm the ﬁndings gleaned from the descriptive statistics
in Table 6. I ﬁnd that CNLs are associated with a large and signiﬁcant drop in the import
values and shares of aﬀected countries. The value of imports drops by about $7 million in
the year the CNL exclusion is implemented, by an additional $10 and $7 million in the ﬁrst
and second year of exclusion, respectively, and $4 million over the subsequent three years
on average (Column 1). Given that the sample average in the pre-exclusion year is $34
million, by the third year of exclusion the value of imports drops by more than 70 percent.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained for the import shares. I ﬁnd that the fraction of
imports drops by 26 percentage points in the year the CNL is implemented, by additional
9 percentage points in the ﬁrst year of exclusion, and 2-3 percentage points in each of the
subsequent four years (Column 2). Compared to the sample average of 63 percent, the import
share is cut in half by the third year of exclusion. These ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion
of economic and demographic controls typically found in gravity-type models (Columns 3
and 4), further conﬁrming that these eﬀects are driven by the change in the GSP eligibility.10
While the above provide evidence on the eﬀects of CNLs, they do not tell us much about
the diﬀerential impact of applicable tariﬀs. In particular, the magnitude of the drop in
imports after the loss of tariﬀ exemptions may depend on the size of foregone savings from
GSP. In other words, the greater the loss of savings from GSP (the higher the MFN tariﬀ
rate), the larger is the drop in imports. This hypothesis is tested by interacting the CNL
measures with MFN ad valorem tariﬀ rates; the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are
expected to be negative.
The sample contains 57 episodes of products subject to a speciﬁc or combination tariﬀ
10GDP and GDP per capita data are not available for Barbados in three years of the sample, hence the
number of observations is smaller when these controls are included.
13rate. These are dropped from the analysis to avoid potential errors in measuring the ad
valorem equivalent tariﬀ rates for these products.11 For the remaining 147 episodes the
average tariﬀ rate prior to the exclusion is 5.5 percent (with a standard deviation of 3.2).
The results reported in Column 5 of Table 7 suggest that the drop in import values is
larger for products facing higher MFN tariﬀ rates. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, at least for the ﬁrst few years immediately after the
exclusion. Moreover, the impact of CNLs on import values is negative in all post-exclusion
years, evaluated at the mean values of tariﬀs. For an average product facing 5.5 percent tariﬀ,
the drop in imports is estimated to be $9 million in the year of CNL implementation, and
additional $14 and $11 million in the ﬁrst and second years of exclusion, respectively. The
impact of CNLs on import shares is qualitatively unchanged after controlling for the MFN
tariﬀ rates (Column 6). The coeﬃcients on interaction terms point in the right direction but
are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Unlike the results for import shares, the results on import values must be viewed with
some caution, since the US demand for these products is not explicitly controlled for. Ad-
ditionally, import values are in nominal terms and do not reﬂect price ﬂuctuations.12 To
test the robustness of the results in real terms, I use quantity information available for 187
episodes of the sample (953 observations). Instead of import values and their shares, import
volumes and their shares are used as the dependent variables. Because of the reduced sample
size, I ﬁrst replicate the base estimates reported in Table 7 and present the results in Columns
1 and 2 of Table 8. The results are qualitatively similar for both values and volumes; the
shares drop by 25 percentage points in the year of CNL implementation, by another 10 and 3
percentage points in the ﬁrst and second year after the exclusion. Although the estimates for
the amount and quantity of imports are imprecisely measured, they point in the right direc-
11The basic results in Columns 1 through 4 are unchanged when the sample is restricted to these obser-
vations.
12As a robustness check, I deﬂated all import values by the price index for imported goods obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The impact of CNLs on the price-adjusted imports is similar to the
base estimates. Naturally, a single price index cannot capture diﬀerences in price ﬂuctuations of diﬀerent
products.
14tion and demonstrate a similar pattern, implying that imports from CNL-aﬀected countries
declined both in real and nominal terms after the exclusion.
The results so far suggest that the excluded exporters need the preferential treatment
to access the US market. Without tariﬀ exemptions, they are unable to maintain the same
level of exports and lose much of their market share. One may argue that only the least
productive ﬁrms stop exporting to the US, while the most productive ones prevail and
continue exporting. This argument may be valid if the value and share of imports were
to drop only in the ﬁrst year of exclusion, with no signiﬁcant changes thereafter. But as
exporters complete their contractual obligations, they choose not to continue exporting to
the US absent tariﬀ exemptions, as evidenced by the continual decline in import values and
shares in post-exclusion years.
4.2 Who beneﬁts from CNLs?
The evidence thus far on the eﬀects of revocation of tariﬀ exemptions clearly indicates that
the import shares, or imports in general, of the aﬀected countries decline. This raises the
question of who displaces the latter. Is it other developing country beneﬁciaries, as intended
by policymakers, or is it non-GSP countries? In order to identify the beneﬁciaries of CNLs,
the import share equation in Column 2 of Table 7 is replicated for each of the latter two sets
of countries. Following Equation (2), the import shares of each are regressed on the post-
exclusion year dummies for the competing CNL-aﬀected countries, with the results reported
in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9.
Given the potential correlation between the residuals of the two equations, SUR estimates
are provided. Indeed, the Breusch-Pagan test of whether the residuals from the two equations
are independent, reported at the bottom of Table 9, rejects the null of independence of these
residuals at the 1% level, suggesting that SUR estimates are more eﬃcient compared to OLS.
I ﬁnd that import shares rise for both other GSP eligible and non-GSP countries, but
considerably more so for the latter; the non-GSP countries seem to beneﬁt the most from
15the CNLs. More speciﬁcally, the import share of other GSP eligible countries increases by
5 percentage points in the year of CNL implementation, by additional 2 and 1 percentage
points in the ﬁrst and second years of exclusion and it remains unchanged thereafter. In
contrast, the import share of non-GSP countries increases in every year after the exclusion:
by 12 percentage points in year 0, 6 and 4 percentage points in the ﬁrst and second years
of exclusion and so on. Thus, by the third year of exclusion the share of imports from
other GSP eligible countries has increased only by 8 percentage points, whereas the share of
imports from non-GSP countries has risen by 22 percentage points.
Are the diﬀerences in the increase in market shares statistically diﬀerent across the two
groups of countries? I test the null hypothesis that the impact of CNLs is the same across
these two groups of countries in each year after the exclusion. The chi-squared statistic
is reported in Column 3, along with the corresponding p-value in parentheses. With the
exception of the year of implementation, the impact of CNLs across the two groups of
countries is statistically diﬀerent from one another in all subsequent years.13
Consistent with the ﬁndings by MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989), the analysis here con-
cludes that CNLs do not seem to achieve their secondary objective in expanding the market
share of less competitive GSP beneﬁciaries. Instead, CNLs seem to provide a competitive
edge to non-GSP countries in capturing the US market.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a systematic analysis of the eﬀect of Competitive Needs Limits on
developing country exports to the US. Using data on trade ﬂows at the HS 8-digit level, I
ﬁnd that CNLs induce a large and signiﬁcant drop in the US imports and market shares of
excluded countries following the revocation of tariﬀ exemptions. These ﬁndings are robust to
13Aside from other exporters, domestic producers of excluded products may beneﬁt from CNLs. After all,
CNLs also pursue a hidden agenda of protecting import sensitive domestic industries. However, the analysis
of domestic shipments of excluded products proves problematic since data at such high level of disaggregation
are not available.
16a number of speciﬁcations that control for the attributes of exporting countries. In addition,
I also show that the lost market shares of the aﬀected countries are captured by non-GSP
countries and not by other less competitive GSP beneﬁciaries. These ﬁndings indicate that
the CNLs do not achieve their stated objectives of revoking tariﬀ exemptions from the most
competitive GSP beneﬁciaries and reserving the beneﬁts for less competitive GSP eligible
countries.
The ﬁndings have clear policy implications. The CNL threshold criteria currently in
place may not correctly identify the most competitive country-product pairs. Indeed, they
often target small or one-time exporters. An alternative criterion could be based on a longer
historical trend in the country-product level imports, instead of the current practice of basing
the exclusion decision on imports of the previous calendar year only. Additionally, CNLs
seem to be a second-best policy choice for expanding the market share of less competitive
GSP beneﬁciaries. Denying preferential market access to the “most successful” exporters
may not necessarily improve the competitiveness of other GSP eligible countries if the latter
simply do not have the competitive edge to produce and export a given product. CNLs
do not address the core reasons for why these countries have small or non-existant market
shares. More targeted policies addressing the production and export facilitation in these
countries might better serve the goals of the GSP.
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Note: Once a country’s annual exports exceed CNL
value threshold, it becomes ineligible for the GSP in the
following year. If a country’s annual exports do not
exceed the value threshold but exceed the percentage
threshold, then the country may receive a de minimis
waiver if exports are less than the de minimis value.
20Table 2: Number of CNL Episodes by Country (in descending order)











(1) (2) (3) (4)
India 26 24 30.8 0.64
Turkey 25 23 29.5 0.65
Brazil 24 24 55.3 0.57
Colombia 22 22 13.6 0.76
Peru 12 12 6.9 0.71
Argentina 12 11 5.0 0.78
Dominican Republic 11 11 1.4 0.73
Russia 8 8 63.6 0.47
Thailand 7 6 168 0.41
Indonesia 7 6 74.8 0.50
Guatemala 7 7 1.4 0.64
Ecuador 6 6 0.5 0.61
Philippines 5 5 82.6 0.49
Kazakhstan 3 2 191 0.17
Venezuela 3 3 97.1 0.48
Panama 3 3 1.7 0.73
El Salvador 3 3 0.2 0.81
Malta 2 2 3.9 0.52
South Africa 2 2 2.0 0.57
Costa Rica 2 2 0.3 0.58
Pakistan 2 2 0.1 0.55
Jamaica 2 2 0.03 0.58
Sri Lanka 1 1 14.6 0.65
Poland 1 1 10.4 0.55
Trinidad & Tobago 1 1 6.7 0.61
Cote d’Ivoire 1 1 4.5 0.86
Bolivia 1 1 3.6 0.52
Barbados 1 1 0.5 0.70
Jordan 1 1 0.3 0.55
Hungary 1 1 0.1 0.66
Honduras 1 1 0.1 0.51
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 1 0.01 1.00
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 5: Dates of CNL Exclusions across Episodes
Year of
exclusion
Number of
cases
1998 35
1999 28
2000 16
2001 17
2003 21
2004 11
2005 16
2006 24
2007 14
2008 22
Total 204
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